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Population Aging in Korea: Implications 
for Fiscal Sustainability
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Adverse demographics in Korea impinges on its growth potential 
and fiscal outlook. Accordingly, this study examines the current 
demographic situation and recent projections related to the impacts 
of population aging in Korea, particularly on the looming fiscal 
imbalance. The focal conclusion is that a two-way effect exists 
from population aging. First is the anticipated stress placed on 
government finances due to increasing welfare expenditure for the 
elderly. Second is sluggish economic growth and thus the inability 
to collect sufficient government revenues. The prospect of large 
and growing deficits is therefore immediate and potentially long 
lasting as governments will be faced with rising spending demands 
and sluggish tax revenues arising simultaneously from an aging 
population. 
Keywords:  Population aging, Public spending, Tax revenues, 
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I. Introduction
Population aging is an irreversible global trend. According to the UN 
(2017), a total of 962 million people are aged 60 years or over in 2017 
Worldwide, which is an increase of 152 percent over the 383 million in 
1980. This number is projected to grow to more than double its 2017 
size, reaching nearly 2.1 billion. In terms of population aging, Korea 
is one of the world’s fastest aging countries. Owing to the continued 
extension of longevity couple with the steep decline in fertility rate, the 
size and percentage of the elderly population (i.e., aged 65 and above) 
rapidly increased in the past three decades. As of the end of 2019, 
the share of people aged 65 or older was 15.5 percent out of the total 
population, up from 14.2 percent in 2018. A study by the National 
Statistics Office (2019) shows that Korea will become the world’s most 
aged society by 2067, with the senior population to comprise 46.5 
percent of the population. 
Falling marriage rates and dismally low child births along with longer 
life are the main causes of the country’s demographic crisis, calling 
for concern about dire macroeconomic consequences. Despite ample 
research over the past decades regarding the likely consequences 
of population aging, on macroeconomy in general and government 
finances in particular, policy action from the government’s end has 
only recently begun its implementation. This current study aims 
to grasp the current demographic situation and recent projections 
regarding population aging in Korea, particularly on the macroeconomic 
implication of population aging. 
This study provides anecdotal and empirical investigation regarding 
the effects of population aging on the Korean economy, focusing on 
the two-way effect from population aging found in recent research 
and projections. The first effect is the anticipated stress placed on 
government finances due to increasing expenditure for the elderly as 
examined in Hsu and Yamada (2019). As the population is getting older, 
municipal and central governments are forced to devote additional 
resources to meet the higher demands placed on programs such as 
senior healthcare or pension, unless significant changes are made 
in the structure of these programs or their benefits. The second 
effect arising from population aging is sluggish economic growth as 
discussed in Aksoy et al. (2019), which in turn leads to slower growth in 
government revenues. As a lower proportion of population will be able 
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to participate in the labor market, overall rates of economic growth are 
bound to fall, which will in turn have negative effects on governments’ 
ability to raise revenues. The prospect of large and growing deficits is 
therefore immediate and potentially long lasting, as governments will 
be faced with increasing spending demands but sluggish tax revenues 
simultaneously arising from an aging population. For example, IMF 
(2005) reports a one percent increase in labor force as improving fiscal 
balance by 0.06 percent point, whereas a one percent point increase in 
the aged population leads to a 0.041 percent point decrease in the per-
capita GDP.
This study is structured as follows. The next section examines 
the trend of demographic shift in Korea and the ensuing projected 
changes in the near future. Possible impacts of this change on labor 
markets and economic growth will also be assessed. We then analyze 
how demographic changes are projected to impact spending on health 
care and welfare programs for seniors. The next section analyzes how 
spending surges in these areas affect the fiscal balance (deficits or 
surpluses) of central government. In the final section, we develop an 
empirical model to quantify the effect of population aging on the Korean 
economy, with emphasis on labor productivity, income, and healthcare 
spending. The paper ends with a brief conclusion.
II. Demographic Changes in Korea
The growth in a country’s population is affected by three factors: 
birth rate, death rate, and net immigration. For much of her history, 
the population growth in Korea was the result of natural increases, 
i.e., the difference between births and deaths, whereas the role of net 
immigration has been negligible. According to the National Statistics 
Office (2019, 2020), however, Korea’s recent fertility rate has fallen 
below the level necessary to replace existing population.1 The result of 
1 The fertility rate is commonly defined as the number of births a woman 
is expected to have by the end of her reproductive years. Since the 1990s, 
the fertility in Korea has declined dramatically. In the early 1950s and 1960s, 
the fertility rate in Korea was 5.6 children per women. By contrast, the figure 
tumbled to 0.98 in 2018 and 0.92 in 2019. The current fertility rate is far below 
the replacement fertility rate of 2.1, at which the size of total population is 
maintained. 
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a declining fertility rate has been a continued slowdown in population 
growth. Figure 1 below illustrates such a drastic shift in demographics. 
The average annual population growth rate in the 1970s was 2.2 
percent, which is in stark contrast to the average annual population 
growth rate for the most recent decade of 2009–2019 at only 0.48 
percent. Compared with the 1960s, the recent figure is an 81 percent 
decline. Based on the medium growth projection by the National 
Statistics Office, Korea’s future population growth rate is projected to 
continue declining. For example, the population growth rate is projected 
to turn negative by 2029. By 2067, the end point in the current forecast 
by the National Statistics Office (2020) predicts the population growth 
rate to be -1.26 percent.
Source: National Statistics Office (2019, 2020)
Notes:  Data for 2020 and onwards are projections based on the medium-
population growth scenario.
Figure 1
Recent DemogRaphic tRenD of KoRea
(a) Births and Fertility Rates
(b) Population
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Apart from slower and even negative population growth, another 
demographic shift Korea is expected to undergo is the increase in life 
expectancy.2 For example, according to OECD (2019), life expectancy at 
birth increased for women from 65.8 years to 85.71 years and for men 
from 58.7 years to 79.7 years over the period of 1970 to 2017. 
One combined effect of a lower population growth and extended life 
expectancy is that seniors will take a fast-increasing portion of future 
population. Figure 2 shows two aging-related statistics. Panel (a) plots 
the share of those over the age of 65 among the entire population 
starting in 2010. From 2010 to 2067, the seniors’ share in Korean 
population is projected to increase from a little over 10 percent to over 
46 percent. The growth rate will be highest from now until the late-
2030s, at which point the senior share of the population will have 
increased to approximately 34 percent. This rapid increase in the share 
of the population over 65 is a result of the aging of the so-called “baby 
boomers,” those born in the years following the Korean War. The senior 
share of the population is expected to grow at a little slower rate in the 
decades after the late-2030s but continuously increasing to roughly 47 
percent of the overall population by 2067. More striking in panel (b) is 
2 Life expectancy at birth measures the number of years a newborn infant 
would live if the current patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to 
remain over its entire life.
Source: National Statistics Office (2019)
Figure 2
population oveR 65 YeaRs olD
(a) Share of 65 + among the Population (b) Projection of 65+ Population
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that the age composition of the seniors is expected to shift toward those 
over 75 years of age, whereas the share of relatively young seniors aged 
between 65 and 69 is projected to decline.
The share of productive population will also be affected by this trend 
of aging. Figure 3 shows the working age (15-64 years old) share of the 
population from 1970 to 2063. This period is first characterized by a 
rapid increase in the share of the working age population as the baby 
boomers entered the labor force in the early period of fast economic 
growth. The working age share of the total population peaked in 2013 
at nearly 74 percent. As this group slowly begins to reach the age of 65, 
the working age share is expected to continuously decline to as low as 
45 percent by 2067.
The combination of the rising share of the aged population and the 
falling share of the working age population inevitably affect labor force 
participation, which simply measures the total labor force as a share of 
the overall population. As Figure 4 shows, the labor force participation 
of those 65 and over is dramatically lower than those in other younger 
age categories. For example, approximately 79 percent and 77 percent 
of Koreans aged between 25 to 49 and 50 to 59, respectively, were 
either employed or actively looking for work in 2019. This demographics 
compares to approximately 34 percent of Koreans over 65 who were 
participating in the labor force. Figure 4 demonstrates that, as the 





shaRe of WoRKing-age population
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participation rate will certainly fall, unless a marked increase happens 
in seniors’ participation in the labor force.
This dire prediction is also reflected in Figure 5, which plots the 
forecasts of total labor force and its decompositions into different age 
groups, conditional on the labor force participation rate of 2016 and the 
projected demographic transitions. Korea’s total labor force is expected 
to fall to approximately 27.4 million by 2035 and to 24.5 by 2050. On 
top of this prediction, age composition of labor force is also expected to 
shift toward the old age group. Whereas the size of young labor force 
(below 45 years old) is likely to decrease by roughly 40 percent by the 
year 2050, the share of old labor force (above 65 years old) will increase 
from the current level of less than 10 percent to nearly one-fourth of the 
total labor force by 2050.
The expected decline in the labor force will also influence the future 
growth of real GDP. According to the growth accounting approach, 
the growth in real GDP of a country can be attributed to three factors: 
increases in the fraction of the labor force employed, accumulation 
of physical capital, and increases in total factor productivity. 
Figure 6 displays historical (1972–2010) and projected (2021–2060) 
decomposition of average annual growth in real GDP into the 
contributions from each of the three components mentioned above.
The results of historical decomposition support the major role 
played by quantitative factors such as labor force and physical capital. 
Source: KOSIS database 
(http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1DA7002S)
Figure 4
laboR foRce paRticipation Rates bY age in 2019
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Apparently, the 70s and 80s were characterized with unprecedented 
fast economic growth in Korea. Most of the real GDP growth was 
attributable to the accumulation of physical capital. What should not be 
overlooked is the contribution of labor force, especially during the 80s. 
In the growth accounting method, qualitative gains in human capital 
are incorporated into the total factor productivity growth. That being 
the case, the marked contribution of the total factor productivity in the 
80s was highly likely to have benefited from the labor force. As the baby 
boomers with solid public education started entering the job market 
in the 80s, the growth potential of the Korean economy was enhanced 
by the improvement in labor force at both the quantitative and the 
qualitative margins. This occurrence is typical of the phenomenon 
known as the demographic dividend: when a large percentage of a 
country’s population is in the working ages as a result of low fertility 
and declining mortality, the working-age population benefits from a 
relatively small dependent population as the size of the elderly cohort is 
small, and the percentage of children is decreasing. This phenomenon 
in turn allows the working-age cohort to amass savings and increase 
productivity. 
The situation will turn to the opposite direction in the future, or it 
may already have. As the baby boomers start to retire en masse from 
2021 onwards, shrinking working age population must support a large 
Source: Lee and Lee (2017)
Figure 5
laboR foRce pRojection bY age (2016–2050)
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and increasing elderly population down the road. The resulting negative 
demographic dividend exhibits itself in the projections for the four 
decades from 2021, where declining labor force is projected to reduce 
annual GDP growth by increasing magnitudes. If the projections in 
Figure 6 are transformed into the per-capita term, the results are as 
shown in Table 1. 
In the 2030s, the growth in the GPD per employed worker is 
approximately 2 percent or higher. Given the continued decrease in the 
labor force and employment caused by population aging, however, the 
growth in per-capita GDP over the same period is expected to be as low 
Source: Lee (2016)
Figure 6
Decomposition of contRibutions to potential gDp gRoWth
Table 1



















2001–2010 3.8 0.7 3.1 1.5 1.6
2011–2020 2.6 0.7 1.9 0.7 1.2
2021–2030 2.1 -0.2 2.3 0.9 1.4
2031–2035 1.5 -0.5 2.1 0.8 1.3
Source: Lee (2016)
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as 1.5 percent. The predicted contribution of the physical capital per 
employed worker is stable at approximately 0.8 percent, reflecting that 
the Korean economy is close to the steady state growth path.
Two conclusions emerge from the discussion above. First, any 
future acceleration in real GDP growth will have to come from faster 
productivity growth. Second, the slower growth in real GDP, resulting 
from the demographic changes, will reduce the size of the Korean 
economy than what has prevailed in the past with a higher rate of 
population and economic growth. The reduction in economic growth 
also means that the tax base for government expenditures will also 
grow more slowly than in previous periods.
III. Demographic Changes and Public Spending
Conceptually, two opposite effects of population aging are identified 
on the financing of government spending programs. On the one hand, 
demographic shifts arising from an aging population will increase 
government program spending primarily via increases in health care 
spending and higher spending on income transfers to seniors. On the 
other hand, an aging population can lead to decreases in government 
spending associated with education and child benefit spending. In 
empirics, however, extant research, such as those of MacLeod and Emes 
(2017) and Robson (2010), has found that the impact of demographic 
changes on the spending requirements of education and child benefits 
are at most modest or unclear. We therefore concentrate on the 
expected increases in public spending caused by population aging in 
terms of the costs of healthcare and other welfare benefits for seniors.
A. Healthcare Costs
For elderly Korean on average to consume considerably higher levels 
of healthcare services than younger cohorts is well expected, given that 
higher ages are associated with higher susceptibility to illnesses and 
costly chronic diseases requiring more frequent medical attention. 
Data confirm this prediction. According to the National Health 
Insurance Service (2019), in 2018, the latest year for which data are 
available, Koreans aged 65 and above accounted for nearly 41 percent of 
all health care expenditures, but they only amount to approximately 14 
percent of the total population. This imbalance between the proportion 
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of the population over the age of 65 and the proportion of health care 
spending attributed to seniors is the result of the increases in chronic 
illnesses and rising ambulatory costs.
Figure 7 illustrates the average medical expenditures of different age 
groups. On a per-patient basis, healthcare spending is heavily skewed 
toward a patient’s earlier (birth related) and later (post 65) stages of life 
after retirement. For instance, in 2018, the average per-patient medical 
expenditures between the ages of 15 and 64 amounted to 1.17 million 
won, whereas the average annual per-patient medical costs for those 
65 and over was 4.41 million won, which is 3.8 times greater than the 
15–64 average. The higher proportion of Koreans expected to be in the 
category of over 65 means increasingly higher health care costs.
As the population of Korea continues to age over the next few decades 
and in the absence of concurrent reforms to the healthcare system, 
healthcare costs are more than likely to increase, as an increasing 
portion of the population enters the age brackets with the highest 
average healthcare costs. For example, a recent study by Lorenzoni 
et al. (2019) predicts that Korea will be one of the countries where the 
effects of demographic shifts on healthcare costs are the highest. More 
specifically, the health spending per capita in Korea is then expected 
to increase by 4.5 percent per year over 2015–2030, the highest rate 
of increase among the member countries. Figure 8 below shows this 
prediction.
Figure 9 shows the projections for the elderly healthcare costs by Lee 
et al. (2015). According to this study, the total medical expenditures for 
Source: National Health Insurance Service Database
Figure 7
healthcaRe expenDituRe peR patient bY age gRoup (2018)
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those aged over 65 are expected to increase up to 390.8 trillion won by 
2060. This number is more than ten-tuple of that estimated for 2020 
and is tantamount to 6.57 percent of GDP. Considering that the medical 
expenditures by total population accounted for 8.1% of GDP in 2018, 
the increase in elderly population accompanied by increases in chronic 
illness and the cost of end-of-life care poses a serious challenge.3 4
3 As of 2008, the medical costs of a patient in the last year of life account 
more than 9 times larger than the average for surviving patient cost over the 
same period. 
4 Number in parentheses are the share in GDP. Projections under the scenario 
of pure aging and 0.8 for the income elasticity of medical expenditure.
Source: Lorenzoni et al. (2019)
Figure 8
gRoWth in aveRage peR capita health expenDituRe (2015–2030)
Source: Lee et al. (2015)
Figure 9
pRojecteD healthcaRe expenDituRes foR 65 + (tRillion Won)4
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B. Welfare Spending on Seniors
Apart from increased healthcare costs, demographic shift also 
requires the government to use other resources to senior welfare 
programs, such as Basic Senior Pensions, Guaranteed Minimum 
Income Payment, Work Provision of Seniors, and Long-Term Senior 
Nursing Insurance. As shown in Figure 10, spending (in nominal 
terms) by the national government on welfare programs for the elderly 
remained below 0.5 trillion won until 2007 and has increased mildly 
until 2013. However, the number has been rapidly increasing since 
then, as new welfare programs were introduced and exiting programs 
were expanded. For fiscal year 2020, spending on these programs costs 
approximately 16.8 trillion won. It represents 3.3 percent of the planned 
total government spending. 
Among many possible causes for such rapid increases in welfare 
expenditures, the main driver is the trend of population aging caused 
by low fertility rate and extended life expectancy. According to Kim and 
Kim (2020)’s prediction, a one percent increase in the aging index (the 
number of elders per 100 persons aged 15 or below) is estimated to rain 
welfare spending for seniors by 0.12 trillion won.
Figure 11 shows how spending on elderly welfare is projected to 
Source: Kim and Kim (2020)
Figure 10
goveRnment spenDing on senioR WelfaRe pRogRams
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increase (Kim and Kim, 2020). Panel (a) plots the predicted costs for the 
three major components of senior benefits, i.e., Basic Pension Program, 
Health Insurance Subsidies, and Long-term Nursing Care. Over the 
next three decades, spending on these key programs is projected to 
increase by 3 percent every year. Panel (b) shows the projections of the 
overall spending on senior welfare benefits, where total senior benefits 
will increase to 680 trillion or so by 2050. This number represents 
approximately 45 percent of the total government income projection for 
the same year by the National Assembly Budget Office (2018). 
Overall, population aging will contribute to a large increase in future 
levels of government spending. In 2019, social welfare spending for 
senior benefits amounted to approximately 13 trillion, accounting 
for approximately 8 percent of the total government budget for social 
welfare. This share is expected to increase to 12 percent and 20 percent 
by 2024 and 2029, respectively. Consequently, mandatory government 
spending welfare programs are projected to reach ten percent relative to 
the size of the economy in 2050, an increase of approximately 4 percent 
point as of 2019.
IV. Fiscal Sustainability
As widely pointed out, a rapid pace of population aging poses a 
serious structural challenge to fiscal sustainability. Two channels for 
future imbalances are related to demographic shifts. The first one is 
(a) Key components of senior benefits (b) Total welfare spending for seniors
Source: Kim and Kim (2020), authors’ graphical presentation
Figure 11
pRojections of senioR WelfaRe spenDing (tRillion Won)
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just described above: increases in spending on healthcare and other 
welfare programs for the elderly. The second is that the growth rate in 
tax revenue is expected to slow down, as taxpaying working population 
shrinks. These two complementary channels will create serious burden 
on public finance, considering that the government’s ability to collect 
tax revenue decreases due to a smaller group of taxpayers. Conversely, 
the government expenditure, particularly on healthcare spending, 
continuously increases.
In addition, as in many high-income countries, pension also plays a 
crucial role, as important as the healthcare spending. As populations 
(a) Revenue and Expenditure (in fixed price of 2020)
(b) Revenue and Expenditure (% of GDP)
Source: National Assembly Budget Office (2020), author’s presentation
Figure 12
pRojections of fiscal squeeze
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age, the number of beneficiaries of public pension schemes will 
increase, whereas the number of contributors is expected to decline 
and thus resulting in deficits. Another adverse effect also comes from 
a reduction in economic growth due to diminishing labor productivity. 
Stagnation in economic growth will lead to a reduction in national 
revenues and savings, which in turn generates negative impacts on 
economic sustainability.
To illustrate the potential size of the looming fiscal imbalance, 
Figure 12 plots the projected government spending and revenues by 
the National Assembly Budget Office (2020) for 2020 to 2050. This 
projection assumes that the details of government expenditure are 
maintained as in the budget bill for 2019 and incorporates the effects of 
the third supplementary budget bill in 2020.
The main takeaway from Figure 12 is the looming deterioration 
in government finances. The projections indicate that the Korean 
government is expected to run a shortfall in every decade of projection. 
Apparently, the deficits are expected to worsen as demographic changes 
place increased demands on government spending. For example, the 
difference between government revenues and total expenditure in 
2030 will amount to 900 trillion won. By 2050, the fiscal imbalance is 
projected to be 7.8 percent of GDP or 246.5 trillion won (using 2020 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office (2020)
Figure 13
pRojecteD goveRnment Debt
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real GDP figures). This finding is in stark contrast to the fiscal surplus 
amounting to 4.7 trillion won in 2019.
Figure 13 displays the consequences of prolonged fiscal deficit on 
government debt projected by the National Assembly Budget Office 
(2020), assuming that the imbalance between government spending and 
revenues in Figure 12 is financed by issuing new government bonds. 
According to this projection, net government debt as a percentage of 
GDP is predicted to be over 75 percent of GDP in ten years now and to 
reach over 131.1 percent by 2050. 
One economic measure of societal aging is the old-dependency ratio 
defined as the ratio of the number of elderly people aged 65 relative 
to working age population, which shows how many elderly people are 
supported by an economically active person. As such, this ratio is 
frequently used for the economic analysis of the impact of population 
aging. For example, a study by KDI (2018) finds that, among the OECD 
countries where the old dependency ratio has increased by more than 
10 percent point since the 1980s, a one percent increase in the ratio is 
associated with a 4 percent point fall in the nominal economic growth 
rate, a 0.8 percent increase in the social welfare expenditure relative to 
GDP, and a 5.7 percent point increase in the ratio of government debt 
to GDP. 
Here, we recapitulate parts of the simulation results by Sung (2009) 
using the annual macro-fiscal model of the Korean economy, which 
examines the responses of key economic variables under the scenario 
that the old-dependency ratio rises by 5 percent point.5 Figure 14 
shows the results. Over the five years following the aging shock, labor 
force decreases by 0.26 percent per annum, and the potential GDP 
falls by 0.09% per annum. Owing to higher welfare spending, total 
government expenditure increases by 4.5 percent per year. By contrast, 
tax revenues are predicted to increase by a mere 1.9 percent per year 
due to the slowdown in labor supply and growth. Consequently, fiscal 
balance relative to GDP aggravates by 0.4 percent annually.
This section attempts to provide an idea of the consequences of the 
fiscal imbalance down the road, but a hidden implication of increasing 
debt is noted to such high levels: the effect of increased interest 
5 This assumption is comparable to the actual increase in the old-dependency 
ratio in the 2010s.
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payments on government budgets. If the burden of interest payments 
increases, the government could be forced to reduce spending in areas 
such as education or other public services. To the extent that higher 
levels of government debt can further lead to lower rates of economic 
growth as found in some empirical studies, such as those of Woo and 
Kumar (2015) and Checherita and Rother (2010), the overall impact of 
aging on debt sustainability can be graver and therefore calls for more 
prudent indebtedness policies.6 
6 Woo and Kumar (2015) found that, for a panel of 38 countries, a ten percent 
point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in 
annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year. 
From a panel of 12 eurozone countries, Checherita and Rother (2010) found that 
the negative growth effect of high debt starts from the levels of approximately 
70% to 80% of GDP.
Source: Sung (2019), authors’ adaptation
Figure 14
pRojecteD goveRnment Debt
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V. Empirical Model of Aging-Macroeconomy Nexus
A. Model and Data
In this section, we perform an empirical analysis of the link between 
population aging and some key aspects of the Korean economy. The 
purpose of this analysis is twofold: first, we aim at quantifying the 
effects of population aging on the macroeconomy discussed in the 
previous sections. Second, the results of the current analysis are 
expected to serve as a guideline for extending toward other full-fledged 
model for aging–macroeconomy nexus. 
Following many previous studies, we adopt a VAR approach to 
examine the macroeconomic effects of aging in Korea7. As discussed in 
the preceding sections, aging and other macroeconomic variables have 
a high tendency to be closely related and to share common long-term 
trends, apart from exhibiting short-term fluctuations around those 
trends. On this ground, we construct a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) for the Korean economy, allowing for the relationship among 
the variables at both the long- and short-term time horizons.
The model we estimate is of the form
	 ∆Yt = ∑
K
i=1Yi∆Yt-i + αβ'Yt-1 + Ψ + εt, 
where Yt is a (p×1) vector of system variables, αβ'Yt-1: a lagged error 
correction term, and Ψ denotes deterministic components comprising 
an intercept and dummies for the periods of economic crisis during 
1997–1998 and 2008–2009. 
7 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, the implications of population 
aging or demographic changes are better addressed by cross-country analysis 
than time-series analysis, considering that these changes exhibit long-term 
effects rather than short-term dynamics. Notwithstanding, quite a few existing 
studies adopt the VAR approach to investigate the macroeconomic effect of aging. 
Lopreite and Mauro (2017) investigated the impact of demographic changes on 
health expenditure in Italy. Doran (2012) examined the effects of fertility rates 
and increases in the old-age dependency ratio on labor effort and production in 
Ireland. Ferraro and Fiori (2020) assessed the effects of demographic structure 
of labor force in the US on the responses of unemployment rate to marginal tax 
rates. 
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Our model is estimated with annual data over the period 1970–2018 
with lag length of 4. Five variables are in the VECM specification 
used: the share of the population over 65 years old (AGING)8, labor 
productivity measured by per capita real GDP divided by total hours 
worked (PROD), per capital real GDP (RGDP), real per capita total tax 
revenues (TAX), and per capita real medical expenditure (MEDEX). All 
data series are obtained from the OECD Data Warehouse, except that 
the series of total nominal taxes collected is obtained from NABOSTAT, 
the database of the National Assembly of Budget Office. Table 2 provides 
further details for the sources, construction, and transformation of data 
series, and Figure 15 plots the five data series thus constructed.
8 Regarding the measure of population aging, alternative indicators such as 
the old dependency ratio or life expectancy are also available. Our choice is 
guided by the discussion in Yoon et al. (2014) that such alternative measures are 
likely to contain the changes in demographic structure caused by forces other 
than the pure aging trend. By using the elderly share among the population, 
we attempt to isolate demographic shifts brought about by the trend of physical 
aging only. 
Table 2
vaRiables useD foR vecm estimation
Variable Description Transformation Raw Series
AGING
People aged 65 and over 
as a ratio of the total 
population.
n.a. Share of 65 and over―elderly
PROD
GDP divided by total work 
hours
log Real GDP per hours worked
GDP Real GDP per capita log
GDP per Head of Population 
(nominal)
GDP Deflator (2015 = 100)
TAX Real Taxes per capita log
Total Taxes Collected 
(nominal)
Population (all age groups)
GDP Deflator (2015 = 100)
MEDEX
Real Current Expenditure 
on Health per capita
log
Current Expenditure on 
Health (nominal) 
GDP Deflator (2015 = 100)
Population (all age groups)
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The precondition for fitting a VECM to data is the presence of unit 
roots in individual series and cointegration among them. We first run 
the ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots. Table 3 presents the results. As 
foreseen in Figure 6, both tests support that all series are nonstationary 
in levels and stationary in first differences.9
9 A possible exception is RGDP, for which the KPSS test rejects the null of 
stationarity in its difference at the 5% significance level. However, the test fails to 
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Table 3
Results of aDf anD Kpss unit Root test
variable
Levels Differences
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
Ho: Unit Roots Ho: Stationary Ho: Unit Roots Ho: Stationary
AGING 1.694 0.244** -5.864** 0.129
PROD 0.398 0.195* -5.981** 0.164*
MEDEX -1.703 0.321* -6.480** 0.047
GDP 0.202 0.323** -6.503** 0.097
TAX -0.847 0.184* -8.606** 0.235
Note:  * and ** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. 
We then apply the Johansen cointegration test to confirm whether 
a cointegration relation exists in the four data series. The results for 
trace statistic and maximum eigen value statistics in Table 4 support 
the null hypothesis that two cointegrating relations exist among the five 
variables, based on which we use the VECM rather than the ordinary 
VAR for the empirical analysis.
Table 4
Results of the johansen cointegRation test 
Ho:
No. of CI
Trace Test Max Eigenvalue Test
Test Statistic p-value Test Statistic p-value
0** 112.360 0.0000 42.819 0.0072
Up to 1** 69.544 0.0013 39.212 0.0023
Up to 2 30.329 0.1489 19.592 0.1911
Up to 3 10.737 0.4195 10.314 0.3758
Up to 4 0.423 0.5155 0.423 0.5155
Note:  Lag order of 3 is determined by the BIC run for the unrestricted VAR. ** 
denotes rejection of the null at the 1% significance level. 
B. Impulse Responses
This section provides econometric evidence on the macroeconomic 
effects of population aging for Korea using an estimated VECM.10 We 
10 Based on the results of preliminary checks in Table 3, we use 3 lags and 
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identify population aging shocks by assuming a recursive ordering, 
with the order of the variables in Table 3 above. Our rationale for 
putting the aging variable at the top of the causal ordering is that the 
aging trend is primarily a consequence of decreasing birth rates and 
extending life expectancy, which are in turn driven by sociocultural 
factors such as industrialization and medical technologies. Therefore, 
population aging is unlikely to react contemporaneously to shocks to 
other macroeconomic variables in the system. We put productivity and 
medical expenses next to aging on the assumption that the first-hand 
effect of aging falls on the overall quality and health of labor force. The 
two latter variables then affect the level of output and then the amount 
of taxes collected.
Figure 16 shows the impulse responses to a one standard-deviation 
increase in the elderly share aging shock identified from our estimated 
VECM. In each panel, the solid line denotes the point estimates of 
responses over the horizon of 20 years. The shaded area represents the 
90% confidence band obtained from a bootstrap procedure with 2,000 
replications. Following its own shock, the responses of the elderly share 
are significantly above zero throughout the two subsequent decades. 
Panel (b) exhibits that the aging shock is associated with continued 
decreases in labor productivity, although the negative response of 
productivity is statistically insignificant. By contrast, the effect of a 
rise in the elderly share manifests itself in the response of medical 
expenditure as shown in panel (c). A positive aging shock results in 
a significant increase in the per capita medical spending, even up to 
20 years of horizon. Translated into tangible numbers, for example, 
if the share of the elderly population increases to 14.3 percent as of 
2018 to 15 percent, the extra amounts an average Korean is expected 
to pay over the following 10 years sum up to 8.5 percent of that paid 
in 2018. The responses of GDP in panel (d) are weak and insignificant, 
in that the negative impact of aging shock on GDP is reversed in 
years 10 to 13 after the shock and then turns back to the correct 
sign. Still, the cumulative effects of the aging shock on GDP remain 
negative throughout the forecasting horizon. Finally, panel (e) shows 
the following: the adverse effect of aging is probably most conspicuous 
in the responses of tax revenues, which remain significantly below 
cointegration rank of 2.
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zero and from year 1 onwards. In summary, our VECM results are 
consistent with and underscore the concerns about the adverse 
ramifications of ongoing population aging in Korea: aggravation in 
labor productivity, decrease in per capita income, increasing burden of 
(a) Responses of AGE
(c) Responses of MEDEX
(e) Responses of TAX
(b) Responses of PROD
(d) Responses of GDP
Figure 16
Responses to one s.D shocK in the elDeRlY shaRe
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healthcare expenditures,11 and decreasing tax revenues.
VI. Concluding Remarks
As Korean population reaches old age, seniors are covering an 
increasingly large share of the population, whereas the portion of people 
in their working age is consequently decreasing. Consequently, labor 
force participation is widely expected to decline, by which economic 
growth and the foundation of collecting tax revenues are imperiled. 
Concurrently, the government is faced with the need to provide health 
care and other welfare programs to an increasing number of seniors. 
For example, the total healthcare expenditures for those aged over 65 in 
2060 are expected to increase up to 281.4 trillion won, tantamount to 
5.84 percent of GDP. In addition, the overall spending on senior welfare 
benefits is projected to increase to 680 trillion or so by the same year, 
representing approximately 45 percent of the total government income 
projection. Assuming that the details of government expenditure are 
maintained as in the budget bill for 2019, this increase in spending will 
contribute to a significant fiscal deficit amounting to 7.1 percent of GDP 
or 237.1 trillion won (using the 2019 actual GDP figures). At this pace 
of the looming fiscal imbalance, net government debt as a percentage of 
GDP is predicted to be over 85 percent by 2050. In sum, the impending 
demographic changes will profoundly affect government spending and 
its ability to raise revenues, imperiling government finances over the 
foreseeable future. The results of a VECM exercise are mostly in line 
with these predictions from previous studies.
The Korean government must make a tough choice. It can simply 
borrow their way through the problem and pass the buck to the 
next generations, at its own risk of fiscal and sovereign debt crisis. 
Otherwise, it can respond to the pressures by reforming public finance 
on one hand and improving economic growth and productivity on the 
other hand. The latter should aim at raising labor force participation 
11 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, the expansion in welfare program 
initiated in 2008 may have an impact on medical expenditure for the elderly. 
Owing to the short data span, however, formally introducing a break in sample 
period is not very plausible. We also believe that explicitly addressing such a 
policy reform in our empirical work will produce even graver prediction of the 
fiscal sustainability in the forecast periods.
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of the elderly and females and encouraging investment in human 
capital and R&D. Regarding the former, many countries are now 
taking measures such as deferring old age pensions and encouraging 
enrollment in private pension by providing tax benefits or subsidies.
As found in Lee at al. (2013) from the panel of 80 countries, responses 
to population aging occur in the form of high retirement savings, high 
labor force participation, and increased immigration of workers from 
developing countries. Thus, a room still exists for appropriate policies 
that help mitigate the adverse consequences of population changes. At 
any rate, recognizing the current juncture of the looming demographic 
problems affecting the government finances is the first step in search of 
the right solutions.
(Received May 16 2020; Accepted August 30 2020)
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